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Abstract
Aim This paper reviews the ethical controversy concerning the use
of monetary incentives in health promotion, focussing speciﬁcally on
the arguments relating to the impact on personal autonomy of such
incentives.
Background Oﬀering people small amounts of money in the
context of health promotion and medical care has been attempted
in a number of settings in recent years. This use of personal ﬁnancial
incentives has attracted a degree of ethical controversy. One form of
criticism is that such schemes interfere with the autonomy of the
patient or citizen in an illegitimate way.
Methods This paper presents a thematic analysis of the main
arguments concerning personal autonomy and the use of monetary
incentives in behaviour change.
Results The main moral objections to the uses of incentives are
that they may be in general or in speciﬁc instances paternalistic,
coercive, involve bribery, or undermine the agency of the person.
Conclusion While incentive schemes may engage these problems on
occasion, there is no good reason to think that they do so inherently
and of necessity. We need better behavioural science evidence to
understand how incentives work, in order to evaluate their moral
eﬀects in practice.
Introduction
Recently, much policy attention has been
focussed on the use of personal ﬁnancial incen-
tives to eﬀect changes in health related beha-
viour. Examples include schemes aimed at
helping smokers to quit, children to eat healthily,
and schizophrenic patients to adhere to their
medication. These schemes attract considerable
public discussion, usually involving a moral
argument against their use. Incentivizing people
this way may involve – critics allege – rewarding
bad behaviour, reducing intrinsic motivation,
treating good citizens unfairly, endangering the
professional-patient relationship, coercing the
vulnerable and so on. On the other hand,
incentive schemes all place individual choice and
responsibility for personal behaviour at the
centre of policy, and it is arguable that they are
more respectful of autonomy than alternative,
more frankly coercive or structure- rather than
agency-focussed approaches to population
health. I do not here discuss the justice-related
concerns about selective targeting of the poor or
equity impacts, but concentrate on personal
autonomous decision making.
doi: 10.1111/j.1369-7625.2011.00664.x
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appraising the moral status of incentive schemes.
I do not intend that this will be applicable
directly to particular schemes; rather it will help
us understand the moral debates about incentive
schemes and their contours somewhat better.
Consider the smoker who wishes to quit, but
either cannot get started, or having made
attempts to quit, keeps falling back into her old
habit. Or the sedentary university professor who
knows he should take regular physical exercise,
but the call of the email is too strong. Here, we
have two examples of individuals who have quite
deﬁnite behavioural changes they want to make,
and health goals they wish to realize, but who
ﬁnd it hard to achieve these changes in a robust
way. Consider further that the smoker ﬁnds
herself pregnant, and the professor is recovering
from a heart bypass operation. Not only do the
people in question have an interest in their
behaviours and health statuses, it is arguable
that other people do, and moreover that there is
a social or State interest here too. This addi-
tional interest may derive from protection of
innocent others from harm, or from justice-
based considerations about health inequalities
or the fair distribution of scarce resources, or
from other reasons. In some situations, the
motivation to change behaviour may originate
not in the persons own occurrent preferences,
but in externally framed interests. I may either
not have preferences in respect of some behav-
iour or be ignorant about the consequences of
acting on my occurrent preferences. For
instance, I may be indiﬀerent between sugar and
artiﬁcial sweetener in my drink, if they taste the
same; and I may be ignorant about their relative
health beneﬁts. The State might take a view that
artiﬁcial sweetener is safer for ones health in
general, and nudge me towards artiﬁcial
sweetener, while leaving sugar an open option.
For instance, it might subsidize artiﬁcial sweet-
ener or tax sugar and allow the price mechanism
to inﬂuence my choice.
Recently, many researchers and policy makers
in health care, public health and health promo-
tion in both developed and developing econo-
mies have taken an interest in ways of positively
shaping the environmental inﬂuences on
choice.
1–4 Traditional approaches to behaviour
change include information provision (which is
of limited eﬀectiveness) and prohibition or reg-
ulation of bad behaviours.
5 Prohibition and
regulation can be eﬀective, but have both prag-
matic and moral diﬃculties associated with
them: the costs of ensuring compliance can be
high; their burdens may lie unequally and
unfairly on diﬀerent sections of society; they can
be relatively insensitive to individual diﬀerences;
and their restrictions on individual liberty can be
diﬃcult to justify.
6
The idea behind actively shaping the envi-
ronmental inﬂuences on choice is that while the
individual patient or citizen retains ultimate
decision-making and deliberative authority over
their own conduct, contextual and situational
factors can be modiﬁed so as to facilitate making
choices which are coherent and acting consis-
tently with those choices. The moral concept of
the authority of the patient in making decisions
in line with his preferences and values, without
undue inﬂuence, domination or coercion, is
usually termed autonomy. Personal autonomy
is currently the central moral value in contem-
porary debates about health promotion. This is
for various reasons: the inﬂuence of the law
relating to consent; the inﬂuence of political
liberalism; and the origins of health promotion
ethics in medical ethics. Thus, debate in this area
tends to focus on how to promote health in ways
consistent with personal moral autonomy and
political liberty.
5 Modiﬁcation of the context of
choice could involve a micro-level strategy tai-
lored to individuals own preferences and iden-
tiﬁed decision-making biases as, for instance, is
used in some web-based schemes involving self-
incentivization. Or it might involve a meso-level
strategy, where individuals in small- or medium-
sized groups come together to regulate each
others behaviour (as in some school or
employment-based incentive schemes). Or, most
commonly perhaps, it might involve a macro-
level strategy. In a macro-level strategy, a
coordinating body (such as a government, local
council, charity or profession) intervenes to
change the environment for relatively large
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would endorse.
An example of a macro-strategy might be the
prohibition of smoking in public places. This is a
policy which commands widespread support,
even among smokers. It does not involve ban-
ning smoking as such. But it does involve
reducing the harm to third parties by moving
smoking outside; and this is the major rationale
for the policy.
7 However, as a side-eﬀect, it
changes the default option for a smoker from
smoking at will, perhaps only semi-consciously,
to needing to make an active decision to go and
smoke. A consequence of this may be that the
smoker cuts down or quits smoking. And this
may well be consistent with what the smoker
actively and explicitly wishes to do, but ﬁnds it
hard to do where temptation is within easy and
constant reach.
8
As it happens, while these eﬀects on smoking
behaviour are welcomed by most public health
practitioners and policy makers, the ban on
smoking in public places is normally justiﬁed by
appeal to the need to prevent harm to uncon-
senting third parties, rather than by appeal to
the health beneﬁts to smokers. This is because of
a worry that appeal to the beneﬁts to smokers
may involve either frank paternalism, or the so-
called tyranny of the majority.
9 We can split the
concern here into two: is the choice of end
paternalistic (i.e., the valuation of something as
a harm and the desire to reduce that harm,
where that harm might be considered as self-
inﬂicted)? And is the selection of means to
reduce that harm paternalistic? Paternalism is
normally considered a bad thing, in that it
involves overriding personal autonomy in the
best interests of the person, rather than letting
her decide for herself. This is bad, under normal
circumstances, because it involves overriding the
person’s considered values, substituting some-
one else’s values illegitimately, and perhaps
treating the person as a mere means to someone
else’s ends. The debate about incentives and
other means inspired by the behavioural sciences
should really focus on the latter, rather than the
former. The former problem is generic to any
public health activity, and it is inherent in any
policy-making involving social coordination.
What we could call the new behavioural public
health is no diﬀerent. But what is diﬀerent about
it is its approach to understanding and inter-
vening in the ways people make decisions and
behave.
Take another smoking example. Until
recently, if I wished to give up smoking, my
resolve was continually challenged by exposure
to highly visible and attractive tobacco product
advertising, reminding me of the pleasures and
glamour of smoking. Now that this advertising
has been almost completely eliminated, I no
longer have these cues all around me, and I am
that much less frequently reminded of my dor-
mant but not extinct desire to smoke. I am still
at liberty to smoke, if I wish to, and I am well
aware of the brands and forms of tobacco
product available to me, because this informa-
tion is easily obtained at point of sale or by word
of mouth. A smoke-free life has become that
much easier, without anything but a trivial
impact on my eﬀective liberty. There may be
arguments about the freedom of speech of the
tobacco manufacturers and vendors, and it
might be argued that the quality of my decision-
making vis-a ` -vis choice of brand or form of
tobacco product has been reduced. But the
former is not relevant to individual autonomy
on the part of the smoker, and the latter is
almost certainly irrelevant where there are other
kinds of information available and where
there is in fact very little to choose between
products.
7,8
This example shows how a change to the
environmental cues to behaviour may have a
beneﬁcial impact on peoples ability to stick to a
behaviour change they will and endorse, without
signiﬁcant impact on their liberty. Contrary to
the intuitive idea that changing environments to
change behaviour must be inherently underhand
and autonomy-undermining, we have here an
example which shows how such environmental
changes may be autonomy-enhancing, by
allowing the agent to stick more closely to his or
her settled choices and decisions. On the other
hand, the example of tobacco advertising also
reminds us that the subtlety of the ways envi-
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involve shaping behaviours in ways which are
not salient to peoples conscious decision making
and which might indeed subvert their most
deeply held or deliberatively endorsed values
and preferences.
10 This represents an important
challenge to individual autonomy. And, in at
least some cases, where agents reject the policys
goals, but the policy makes it harder for them to
stick to their preferences, this may additionally
involve unfairness.
11
One type of intervention to support personal
behaviour change which has received consider-
able attention is the use of personal ﬁnancial
incentives. Money incentives – as we shall see –
are intended to reinforce the desirability or
feasibility of behaviour changes which a patient
may wish to perform but for one reason or
another fails to do in the absence of an incen-
tive. They bring long-term goals into the short
term decision horizon, for instance.
12 In this
paper, I will give a preliminary account of the
moral issues which arise in the use of such
incentives in health promotion, paying particu-
lar attention to considerations of personal
decision-making autonomy. It is not my inten-
tion here to give conclusive arguments about
the merits and disadvantages of this type of
intervention, or speciﬁc instances of it, but
rather to give an overview of the types of
arguments which arise.
A case study
Consider a 16-year-old young woman, Holly,
who has been oﬀered Chlamydia screening, and
has either declined it or failed to attend her
appointment. The local health-care provider (in
England, the Primary Care Trust), noting low
rates of uptake of the programme in this age-
group, has established a scheme whereby if
young adults between the ages of 12 and 18
come for screening, they will be given a £10
mobile telephone credit. The scheme is a general
scheme for the agegroup: the health-care pro-
vider decides that selective entry criteria which
exclude the sexually inactive are ineﬃcient and
put participants oﬀ. Learning of this scheme,
Holly presents herself for screening. There are
three broad concerns here: coercion, bribery and
undermining her autonomy.
Coercion
The ethical arguments here are diverse. A ﬁrst
argument, often mentioned in media debates
about this type of incentive scheme, is that it
involves coercion. The reasoning is that Holly
has changed her behaviour in response to the
oﬀer. But for the oﬀer, she would – it is assumed
– not have come for screening. It is further
assumed that her non-attendance reﬂects a
considered choice on Hollys part, and that
therefore she has good reasons not to attend.
The oﬀer of a ﬁnancial incentive has overborne
her considered choice, essentially making her do
something that all other things considered she
does not wish to do.
One diﬃculty here is that there is no standard
account of coercion which is a commonly agreed
upon account of what it involves.
13 While there
are a range of philosophical accounts of coer-
cion, these do not map tidily onto either the
ordinary language usages of the term or even
onto the legal usage. Another problem is that the
argument may well prove too much: a frequently
used counter-argument here is that on this
account, any paid employment involves coer-
cion. Moreover, it rests on the questionable
assumption that Hollys non-attendance did
reﬂect a considered choice, as opposed to inertia,
forgetfulness, or having other things to do which
were more pressing or enjoyable. Finally, it is
possible that Holly may not object to screening,
so much as not see its relevance; and further,
that as she sees it as irrelevant to her, she
therefore thinks it is being done for others
beneﬁt alone (including the beneﬁt of the pro-
fessionals). And hence, it might be that she
expects to be paid to do something which ben-
eﬁts others but not her. On this account, she
might think it more coercive to persuade, cajole
or harass her into attending for screening, than
to be paid to do so.
As we can see, the coercion theory is very
diﬃcult to make out, purely on the basis of
Personal ﬁnancial incentives in health promotion, R E Ashcroft
  2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Health Expectations, 14, pp.191–200
194making sense of an individuals response to an
incentive. It may be that some version of the
coercion theory can be sustained, under speciﬁc
conditions. One way it may work is that if the
subject is oﬀered a signiﬁcant amount of
money, conditional on completing a particular
series of actions, then what is most salient to
them is not the value of the actions in them-
selves, but the fear of loss of the reward.
Behavioural economists point to the well-doc-
umented phenomena of fear of anticipated
regret.
14 Coercion typically works by forcing an
agent to do something through fear of the
consequences of not doing it. To force you to
do something, I must arrange that the costs to
you of not doing so are both large and fright-
ening to you. And I must arrange that your
welfare is dependent on my will, so that you
have an interest in keeping me happy, on pain
of your feared loss. So, in the incentive situa-
tion, if the structure of my oﬀer of money is
such that you come to consider the money as
already yours, then my proposal not to pay
you unless you do as I ask is framed as a loss.
And if the loss is big enough, you may feel
coerced to comply. The scale of the loss here is
to some extent subjective: one element of some
acts of coercion is that they work by taking
advantage of pre-existing needs, so that oﬀers of
even small amounts of money might coerce
somebody in poverty. This would be explicable
in two, possibly interacting, ways: ﬁrst, the
degree of desperation induced by severe poverty
might make even a small incentive much-
needed; and second, even if the recipient is not
desperately poor, the utility of a small amount
of additional money can still be predicted to be
much greater than the utility of the same
amount of money to someone much better oﬀ,
because of the well-attested phenomenon of the
diminishing marginal utility of money.
15,16
These questions are ripe for empirical investi-
gation as much of our ethical argument here
depends on the speciﬁc features of the psycho-
logical mechanisms in play, and as much of our
policy choice will turn on how and when these
mechanisms work as well as when interventions
based on them are morally justiﬁed.
Bribery
Suppose Holly does not feel coerced, and no
impartial observer would consider her choice to
be coerced. Another moral diﬃculty with her
decision to take part in screening may then arise.
This is the claim that she has been bribed to take
part. There are two diﬀerent moral concerns
here. One is that she has been paid to do
something which she should have been doing
anyway. This is the type of bribery that concerns
us in connection with paying bribes to public
oﬃcials merely to do their jobs in a timely and
professional way. The other is that she has been
paid to do something which she should not have
been doing anyway. This is the type of bribery
that concerns us in connection with paying
bribes to public oﬃcials to secure (unfairly) a
beneﬁt to the payer of the bribe.
Some critics of inducement to Chlamydia
screening may disapprove of the screening
programme as such. Here, we have an unusual
case, since there is presumably nothing wrong in
itself with diagnosing and treating a curable
infectious disease (assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Chlamydia screening is safe, has
low false positive and negative rates, and that
the treatment is safe and eﬀective).
17 But the
critics may consider that the screening
programme has deleterious eﬀects on the morals
of young people, perhaps by contributing to a
culture of safe sex in teenagers and young
adults rather than no sex (abstinence before
marriage). This is a standard type of objection to
harm reduction programmes.
18 This is a debate
all on its own. Here, let us suppose that there is a
moral objection to screening, held strongly by
some. Those people will see an inducement to
participate as corrupting Hollys morals, by
inducing her to participate in an immoral
programme, and by getting her to change her
mind, or at least her behaviour, for money.
Individuals who have no such moral objection
to Chlamydia screening might object to the
inducement scheme for precisely opposite rea-
sons. They might see it as bribery, in that Holly
should participate for non-monetary reasons:
because it is in her interest to do so, and because
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infection surveillance and control. Many critics
of incentive schemes dislike this apparent feature
they share, of paying people to do what they
should be doing anyway.
19
This concern can also be analysed further.
First, there is the concern that payment may
weaken internal motivation, and second, that it
may undermine prosocial behaviours.
20 The
weakening of internal motivation concern is that
we may shift people from doing things because
they are the right thing to do, or because it is in
their own best interests, to doing things to get
external rewards. If I do something for the
money, the thought goes, I am orientating my
practical reason towards the reward, and over-
looking the reasons which properly ought to
motivate me (my health or the public good, for
instance).
21 I may even come to expect reward, so
thatIamlesslikelytoactonintrinsicmotivations
than I was before. Indeed, this attitude might
come to infect my decision making outside the
context of this particular incentive scheme and
become a more general feature of my expecta-
tionsandmotivations.Thistakesustothesecond
concern that I may be more likely to act in ways
which beneﬁt others only where there is some
tangible beneﬁt in there for me. This has some-
times been argued in the context of payments to
research subjects in social survey research; if no
payment is oﬀered at all, then a certain response
rate might be typical across society at large, but if
some payment is oﬀered, not only may response
rates in surveys which do pay fall (if people think
the payment is insuﬃcient), they may fall further
in surveys which do not pay, as there is an
expectation that researchers should pay and that
payment signals that the research is really just in
the interest of the researcher and not in the gen-
eral public interest. This concern is sometimes
studied by economists under the label motiva-
tion crowding out.
19
How are we to evaluate these arguments? The
ﬁrst observation, again, is that largely they
depend on testable empirical hypotheses, and
there is an extensive literature in psychology and
behavioural economics on just these hypotheses
in other contexts.
22 Secondly, as with the coer-
cion objection, the bribery objections – they are
really as I have shown here a family of objec-
tions rather than just one – may prove too much.
There are many activities where payment is
necessary and expected, and where the remu-
nerated behaviour is in the interest of the agent
or the public, but we do not label the payment
bribery and evaluate its moral status as such.
Philosophy lecturers typically expect to be paid
for their work, for instance, even if they would
philosophize without payment and even if doing
philosophy is in the public interest. To make
sense of the bribery claim we need a much ﬁner
grained and contextually sensitive account of the
moral wrong the bribery claims are trying to
identify. Partly this depends on the texture and
context of the transaction: many parents would
think it wrong to pay their child to do their
homework, and wrong to pay them to clear
Grannys garden of fallen leaves, but acceptable
for them to be paid by a healthy adult neigh-
bour. On the other hand, Granny might well
give the child a token reward for being a good
boy, having tidied her garden, being careful to
make it clear that it was a gift, not a payment for
work. And grasping the diﬀerences between
reward and payment, and contract and gift is no
trivial matter, especially for a child. This is a
very subtle sociological problem, which has had
relatively little recent work performed to inves-
tigate it empirically.
23
Undermining autonomy
The purported moral wrongs in coercion and in
bribery are in a sense external threats to
autonomy. They rest on the assumption that
the agent is autonomous, and address her as
such. Holly, it is assumed, knows that she
should go to be screened, but cannot be both-
ered, and has to be bribed to do what she
should. Or, she is a ﬁne upstanding woman,
who rejects the oﬀer because she has ﬁrm moral
objections to it. But the oﬀer of money cor-
rupts her resolve, either through need of the
inducement, or fear of the loss, or some other
reason to do with being distracted by a pow-
erful extrinsic motivation.
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undermining autonomy itself. On the above
account, Hollys autonomy is not undermined,
so much as suborned. But if she were to feel that
actually she was not the author of her choice to
be screened in any meaningful way, or that her
status as a person was in doubt or under threat,
we might want to say that her autonomy as such
was undermined. Noting that in Hollys case,
given the nature of the intervention and the
types of incentive used, this is unlikely, let us
turn to cases where autonomy is already fragile:
mental illness and drug dependency.
Notice ﬁrst that there are forms of coercion
which are so extreme as to involve breaking the
will of the agent. Torture is a typical exam-
ple.
24,25 So far as I am aware no critic of
incentives in health promotion alleges that
incentives break the will of agents, and arguably
even very large sums of money would not do so
in the way that physical pain or intense and
acute psychic distress do. What very large
incentives might do is induce someone to do
something which radically disrupts the narrative
unity of their personhood. The standard exam-
ple here is the indecent proposal, where some-
one may be induced to betray some important
personal or normative commitment under the
lure of large ﬁnancial gain.
26 There are two ele-
ments to the concern here: one is with personal
integrity itself, and the other is with the
behavioural change induced. In the health con-
text, it is hard to imagine a personal behavioural
change which would involve a radically disrup-
tive change in someones self-image, in ways
which neither the person evaluating the decision
prospectively nor the person looking back on the
decision would endorse as being their own
decision, but one example may be a schemes
which oﬀer sterilization to people with drug
problems or large families (one such scheme
being the widely publicised Project Preven-
tion).
27 Decisions to break an addiction may
well involve a breach in the narrative unity of
the self – I might well see me as an addict and
me clean as truly diﬀerent people. But this
could be something I profoundly wish after
the change, and profoundly endorse before-
hand.
28,29 The most likely case involves inducing
someone to take long-term antipsychotic medi-
cation in a context where all things considered
they dislike the side-eﬀects of the medication
and see their unmedicated self as their true,
authentic self.
30 This is indeed a troubling
problem in the ethics of psychiatry. But it should
be stressed that the moral status of inducement
here does not depend on this dilemma. The
dilemma exists whether or not the inducement is
oﬀered, and insofar as we dislike an inducement
in this context, it is arguably because it is an
inducement to do something we dislike, or judge
to be wrong, rather than because of anything
inherently wrong in the inducement itself.
31
Perhaps this is too quick. It may be that
treating someone with antipsychotic medication
is only acceptable with their consent (for
instance, the Mental Health Acts in the UK
require the capacitous consent of even formally
detained patients to electroconvulsive therapy,
for instance). It may be that this is because the
medication changes the personality in impor-
tant respects. So if we are concerned that the
inducement undermines the quality of the
decision by the patient, then the moral justiﬁ-
cation for the treatment itself may be in
question.
How may inducements undermine the quality
of the decision? Recall the concern about
extrinsic motivation. That was introduced as a
concern about undermining peoples ability to
do the right thing for the right moral reason.
However, it may be that it applies here too, in a
diﬀerent way. If the moral justiﬁcation of the
treatment rests on the deliberative endorsement
of the treatment (assume here that we are dis-
cussing long-term treatment of the mentally ill in
the community, rather than crisis treatment of
someone acutely mentally ill), then what may be
from a legal point of view a valid, capacitous
consent may fail to be a morally valid consent. If
it matters that the patient is doing it in full
knowledge of the risks and implications of
accepting treatment (and of the alternatives and
their consequences), then a decision which is
actually made with one eye on the money may
not meet this test. In some cases this is clear: a
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but desperately needs the money, and consents
speciﬁcally to get the money is perhaps better
described as being coerced, as above. But con-
sider the more subtle case of the patient who,
perhaps distracted by the money, fails to delib-
erate carefully enough and consents in a spirit of
oh, all right then. Has he been nudged in an
insidious way? Has the focus on the mechanisms
of his personality come to treat his person as
merely phenomenal, in such a way that his moral
autonomy has been undermined?
21
Much of the discussion of incentives in the
policy literature builds on the work popularized
in Sunstein and Thalers Nudge. In my opening
section I described an approach to making
smoking cessation easier by banning tobacco
advertising. The idea was not to ban smoking as
such, but simply to regulate the ways in which I
can obtain information about it, so that I can
obtain it easily should I wish but not have it
forced on me should I wish to avoid it. This is a
very crude approach to adjusting my choice
architecture as Sunstein and Thaler put it. More
subtle ways of doing so involve building on
evidence from psychology and behavioural eco-
nomics about the ways in which my decision
making may be erratic, irrational or self-sub-
verting. These experimentally inspired (and
sometimes experimentally evaluated) interven-
tions aim both to understand how we manage to
make choices which are incoherent with our
stated preferences or the values of our best
selves, and to restructure the conditions under
which we make choices so that they are not
subverted in the same way. However, it is
arguable that the strategy is troubling. Typically,
these interventions do not work by unbiassing
our decisions and choice frameworks. Instead,
they work by using the same biases to produce
choices which ﬁt with our stated preferences or
values of our best selves. So the idea is not
actually to improve the quality of our decision
making, but to trick ourselves.
This may not matter. Although Ulysses con-
tracts, for instance, are controversial, this is not
because of how they work in the present, by
making us pre-commit to a certain course of
action and making us stick to it. The idea of a
Ulysses contract draws on the classical myth of
Odysseus ⁄Ulysses, who wished to hear the song
of the Sirens without risking being lured to his
death. He instructed his sailors to tie him to the
mast, and not to untie him until they had passed
the Sirens, whatever he might say thereafter, and
no matter how forcefully he insisted.
32,33 In
psychiatry and dementia care, a Ulysses contract
is a form of advance decision whereby the
patient, while competent, binds himself to a
certain treatment plan even if, later, he says
(competently or otherwise) that he wishes to be
released from it. It is because they bind future
selves to the wishes of present selves in ways
which the future selves may not truly endorse. A
person can rationally sign a Ulysses contract,
endorsing both the course of action committed
to, and the mechanism of enforcement. They are
vulnerable to the criticisms that people may
genuinely change their minds and that the con-
tracts are insensitive to changes in external cir-
cumstance. Now, consider the incentive scheme
which seeks to nudge us into giving up smoking
by oﬀering us small short term rewards, and thus
overcoming the weak inﬂuence long run future
health states have over the present desire to
smoke. If I consent to the incentive schemes
structure, and to the plan to give up smoking,
and to the psychological mechanism, then I have
consented in full to intervention. But it is likely
that absent a good explanation, I do not grasp
the way in which the scheme works. And my
consent may indeed by framed by factors other
than deliberative endorsement of the smoking
cessation intervention. It may be that my
apparently autonomous decision making is
being tweaked by this psychological sleight of
hand.
In a health-care ethics arena in which we place
enormous moral and epistemological emphasis
on autonomous choice, the idea that we cheat
autonomy by framing the context of choice in
ways which the agent may not notice or take
accountofiscontroversial.Thereareanumberof
possible responses here. First, it is clear that
autonomous choice, given the pervasiveness of
cognitive biases, is empirically, if not norma-
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198tively, much more complex and perhaps com-
promised than we ordinarily allow. Second, it is
also true that many actors in the health ﬁeld are
making diverse uses of these cognitive biases in
ways we often overlook or are unaware of –
notably the behaviour of the food, tobacco and
otherindustriesandcompanies.Inthelightofthe
pervasiveness of cognitive biases, we should of
course highlight the way that corporate actors
interveneinwayswhichtradeonthesebiases.But
this will not eradicate those biases. Indeed, most
likely nothing can. Given that, making good and
morally careful use of them is sound policy.
Moreover, if it can be performed in a way which
commands reﬂectivedeliberative endorsement by
citizens and patients, then arguably it is morally
justiﬁed, provided it is fair, eﬀective and eﬃcient.
Conclusion
In this short paper, I have not been able to give a
comprehensive moral evaluation of the use of
incentives in health promotion and health care.
In particular, I have not discussed the equity and
social justice elements of the debate, and have
concentrated almost exclusively on the issues
relating to personal moral autonomy. Nor have
I been able to examine in any depth what we can
call the relational or constitutive elements of
autonomy, particularly in the context of the
impact on the doctor–patient relationship and
the role that incentives might play in altering the
terms of that relationship.
29,34 I have concen-
trated, in perhaps a rather traditional way, on
the ethics of inﬂuencing what one person decides
without deeper consideration of their social and
political context. This is simply a ﬁrst iteration,
intended to open, rather than close, the question
of when and how incentives may be ethically
acceptable in health care. The somewhat trite
argument that we allow people to be paid to
work, so paying them to do other things too
introduces no new moral problems is clearly
false, because it neglects the social meanings of
diﬀerent spheres of life, and diﬀerent ways of
choosing.
35 Nonetheless, too hasty a dismissal of
incentives overlooks their potential beneﬁts, and
perhaps relies on a naive conception of the
person in its own turn. What I have attempted to
do, in the light of some of the behavioural sci-
ence evidence, is show that the initial moral
reactions widely reported in the literature and
the mass media turn out on closer inspection to
be neither so compelling nor so straightforward
as they at ﬁrst appear. Further analysis and
empirical evidence are certainly necessary.
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